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ARTICLE 
WHO IS WORTHY? NON-LAWYER 
PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE AND 
SINGAPOREAN LAWYER DISCIPLINARY 
SYSTEMS 
Dr. Kay-Wah Chan* & Helena Whalen-Bridge** 
ABSTRACT 
Historically the profession of lawyers self-regulated their 
members’ ethics through codes of conduct and disciplinary 
proceedings. This traditional approach to regulating lawyer 
performance and behavior has been increasingly subject to scrutiny 
and criticism. In some countries, consumer advocates and concern for 
access to justice for clients have combined to produce systems of 
regulation in which other actors have a more active role in the 
regulatory process. In particular, non-lawyer participation in lawyer 
discipline provides a voice for persons who as a group may be most 
affected by poor lawyering, but if the non-lawyers are lay persons, they 
may have little understanding of law or legal practice. This article 
considers and compares non-lawyer participation in disciplinary 
systems for lawyers in Japan and Singapore, two of the most advanced 
economies in Asia. Due to historical reasons, Singapore has a common 
law system and Japan has a civil law system, but lawyers in both 
countries have played a dominant role in the examination and 
discipline of professional infractions.  Both countries have also 
incorporated non-lawyer participation into the disciplinary process.  
Singapore has inserted non-lawyers into the process and Japan has 
enhanced non-lawyers’ participation. Why has this occurred, and to 
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what effect? Both jurisdictions maintain confidentiality at most or all 
stages involving non-lawyers, and performance-related data regarding 
the impact of non-lawyers is not readily available. The article therefore 
considers the reasons why non-lawyers were included or why their 
participation was enhanced, the different degrees of involvement, how 
non-lawyer involvement is conceptualized and managed, and the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, lawyers were disciplined for violations of ethical 
codes without the public’s participation or access to proceedings. 
According to one scholar, the discipline administered by lawyers’ 
professional organizations was slow, overly lenient to lawyers, and 
unresponsive to consumer concerns.1 In the United States, most states 
adhered to a process overseen by the state supreme court, and 
administered by a disciplinary board and adjudicated by a hearing 
committee composed of legally trained persons. 2  The process was 
confidential to protect the reputation of the attorney. 3  Lawyers 
investigated and made determinations in part because it was thought 
that only lawyers had the expertise necessary to discipline members of 
the legal profession.4 The process in other countries differed but the 
exclusion of non-lawyers was fairly consistent.5 In Europe, the Council 
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (“CCBE”) recommended that 
disciplinary proceedings be independent from state authorities, with 
primary responsibility resting with the bar or law society.6 
The exclusion of non-lawyers from the attorney disciplinary 
process has, however, experienced change. In the United States, 
“[l]awyer disciplinary mechanisms have been criticized for their lack 
of transparency since at least the 1970s,” 7  and in the 1990s the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) McKay Commission found that 
secrecy was the “greatest single source of public distrust” regarding 
disciplinary proceedings, which caused great harm to the reputation of 
the profession. 8  In response to ABA recommendations and court 
challenges, the process in the United States has been opened up at a 
variety of stages.9 In the United Kingdom, the Legal Services Act of 
 
1.  Leslie C. Levin, Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System: The Queensland 
Experience, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 187, 187 (2006).  
2.  Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1597, 1599 (1994) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
3.  Id. at 1598. 
4.  Id. at 1599. 
5.  See, e.g., Levin, supra note 1, at 188-91. 
6.  COUNCIL OF BAR AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUR., CCBE RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
DISCIPLINARY PROCESS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (2007). 
7.  Panagoitis Delimatsis, The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation: Enforcement and 
Compliance in Professional Services, 40 HASTINGS INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 1, 40 (2017). 
8.  ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENF’T, LAWYER REGULATION FOR 
A NEW CENTURY 30 (1992). 
9.  Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1598. 
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2007 constituted a major overhaul of the legal profession. One of the 
changes was the creation of the Legal Ombudsman (“LO”), an 
independent body responsible for overseeing the regulation of all 
lawyers in England and Wales.10 The Chief Ombudsman of the LO 
must be a lay person,11 and their appointment ends if they cease to be 
a lay person.12 In 2018, the LO website identified two members of the 
seven person board as non-lay members. 13  The LO handles only 
complaints regarding “poor service,” and it refers “issues regarding 
professional misconduct” to the relevant approved regulator, “for 
example, the Bar Standards Board (for barristers) and the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (for solicitors).” 14  The Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal adjudicates alleged breaches of rules and regulations 
applicable to solicitors, and at the time this article was written, the 
Tribunal had forty-six members, thirty-two Solicitor Members and 
fourteen Lay Members, “drawn from a wide range of backgrounds to 
reflect the makeup of the profession and, as far as possible, the 
public.” 15  Sufficiently serious complaints against barristers are 
forwarded to the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service (“BTAS”), an 
independent organization that arranges disciplinary tribunals. 16 
Disciplinary tribunals have three or five people, depending on how 
serious the charges are. 17  Tribunal members can be barristers, lay 
people, and judges; all tribunals include at least one lay person.18 
The purported reasons for including lay persons in lawyer 
disciplinary processes differ across jurisdictions, but arguably 
comprise three main concerns. First, there is a perception that self-
regulation is self-serving, and that if left on their own, lawyers will 
whitewash problems rather than discipline a fellow lawyer. Second, 
 
10.  See Legal Services Act (2007), c. 29, Part 6 (Eng. and Wales). 
11.  Id. § 122(2). 
12.  Id. § 122(6). 
13.  About Us: Our Board, LEGAL OMBUDSMEN http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/
about-us/#our-board [https://perma.cc/D2Z8-GTV7].  
14. CATHERINE FAIRBAIRN, COMPLAINTS AGAINST SOLICITORS AND OTHER LAWYERS, 
2017, HC Briefing Paper 03762, ¶ 1.6. 
15.  About Us, SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL, 
http://www.solicitorstribunal.org.uk/about-us [https://perma.cc/QT56-QP3B].  
16.  The disciplinary tribunal process, BAR STANDARDS BOARD, 
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-professional-conduct/disciplinary-
tribunals-and-findings/the-disciplinary-tribunal-process/ [https://perma.cc/C9A3-DL48]. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
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there is the goal of consumer protection; lawyers should avoid 
protecting their fellow lawyers but they also need direction regarding 
the goals to achieve, i.e. client service and maintenance of standards. A 
third concern is that unless there is broader participation in the 
disciplinary process, it lacks moral authority.19 This strain of thought 
has a basis in democratic representation,20 and while jury trials are 
quite different from lawyer disciplinary processes, they also have 
elements in common, as appears in the discussion of the Singapore 
context below.21 When non-lawyers are brought into the process of 
investigating and determining lawyer complaints, they arguably 
address these three issues, but they raise other concerns. The primary 
concern is that only legally trained persons have knowledge of the law 
and familiarity with the realities of legal practice sufficient to 
competently evaluate alleged breaches of ethical and professional 
rules. A related concern is that because they do not have the requisite 
legal knowledge, non-lawyers will have to rely on or perhaps be 
overwhelmed by legally trained voices, and thereby be limited in their 
ability to bring a consumer perspective to bear. 
The questions raised in this Article are whether countries in Asia 
have engaged with these issues, and if so, what procedures have they 
adopted and why? The Article considers Japan and Singapore, two of 
the most advanced economies in Asia. For historical reasons, 
Singapore has a common law system and Japan has a civil law system.  
In both countries, lawyers have played a dominant role in the 
examination and discipline of professional infractions, but Singapore 
has inserted non-lawyers into the process and Japan has enhanced non-
lawyers’ participation. In discussing these changes, the Singapore 
section of the Article uses the statutory term “lay person,” while the 
Japan section uses the term “non-bengoshi” [non-lawyer]; these terms 
mean different things in Japan and Singapore, and do not necessarily 
indicate a lack of legal training, but for ease of reference the 
introduction and conclusion use the term “non-lawyer.” Why have non-
lawyers been included in disciplinary proceedings in Singapore, why 
 
19.  Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative 
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L. J. 253, 280 (2012). 
20. See Valerie P. Hans, Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making: Introduction to Law 
& Policy Special Issue, 25 LAW & POL’Y 83, 87 (2003); see also Stephan Landsman, 
Commentary: Dispatches from the Front: Lay Participation in Legal Processes and the 
Development of Democracy, 25 LAW & POL’Y 173, 173 (2003). 
21.  See infra Section III.C. 
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has their participation been enhanced in Japan, and what effect have 
these changes had? Confidentiality is maintained at most stages 
involving non-lawyers in both countries, and performance-related data 
regarding the impact of non-lawyers is not readily available. The article 
therefore considers the reasons why non-lawyers have been included 
or had their participation enhanced, the different degrees of non-lawyer 
involvement, how non-lawyer involvement is conceptualized and 
managed, and the potential issues raised by the respective approaches. 
II. JAPAN 
In Japan, because of its civil law tradition, lawyers [bengoshi], 
prosecutors, and judges are collectively called the legal professionals 
[hôsô]. Similar to many other countries, the regulatory regime of 
bengoshi ethics includes a disciplinary mechanism. While bengoshi are 
self-regulated, people who are not bengoshi (“non-bengoshi”) are also 
involved in the disciplinary system, as members of the various relevant 
committees. The relevant law, the Attorney Act (“the Act”),22 requires 
that Committees be composed of bengoshi, judges, prosecutors and 
“persons of learning and experience.”23 The law has not defined the 
term “persons of learning and experience.” However, the wording 
“learning and experience” suggests that potential candidates may be 
restricted to people who are educated or further restricted to educated 
people of a certain social standing. The bar associations generally do 
not publish details regarding the background of the members of their 
discipline-related committees. Furthermore, committee members’ 
identities are generally “confidential information.”24 However, there is 
an impression or belief that these persons of learning and experience 
are mainly, if not exclusively, university academics, and particularly 
law professors.25 The disciplinary process is closed to the public.26 In 
2004, a reform enhanced non-bengoshi’s participation as one of the 
means to create a more transparent, prompt and effective process in 
 
22.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], Law No. 205 of 1949 (Japan). 
23.  Id., art. 66-2, ¶¶ 1, 2; art. 70-3, ¶¶ 1,2. 
24.  Kyoko Ishida, Deterioration or Refinement? Impacts of an Increasing Number of 
Lawyers on the Lawyer Discipline System in Japan, 24 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 243, 244 (2017). 
25.  While this article literally translates the Japanese term as “persons of learning and 
experience,” Ishida in her work referred them as “law professor[s]” or “academic expert[s].” See 
id. at 244, 256. The term is also translated as “academic expert(s)” in the English version of the 
Attorney Act available on the online Japanese Law Translation Database System, which is 
operated by the Ministry of Justice, Japan. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22.  
26.  Ishida, supra note 24, at 247. 
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order to secure the people’s trust of the bengoshi profession, legal 
professionals, and the whole justice system. This suggests that non-
bengoshi are included in the process in order to secure transparency. 
This Article argues that, despite the reform, there are structural 
weaknesses in the system. The article also analyzes why these 
weaknesses were not addressed in the reform. 
A. THE LAWYER DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM IN JAPAN 
1. Current Disciplinary System 
In Japan, a bengoshi must join a local bar association where his or 
her office is situated and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
(“JFBA”),27 both of which have disciplinary power over him or her.28 
A bengoshi may be disciplined if he or she violates the Act, the Articles 
of Association of the JFBA (“JFBA Articles”), or the Articles of 
Associations of the bengoshi’s local bar association. 29  Disciplinary 
sanction may also be imposed if a bengoshi commits an act that harms 
the order or reputation of the bengoshi’s local bar association.30 A 
bengoshi may also be disciplined if he or she misbehaves in or outside 
professional activities in a manner that impairs the bengoshi’s own 
integrity.31 The disciplined bengoshi will be reprimanded, suspended 
from practice for no more than two years, ordered to withdraw from the 
local bar association, or disbarred.32 
Each local bar association has a disciplinary enforcement 
committee [Kôki I’inkai] (“DEC”) 33  and a disciplinary action 
committee [Chôkai I’inkai] (“DAC”). 34  Any person can make a 
disciplinary request against a bengoshi at his or her local bar 
association.35 A local bar association can also initiate the process.36 In 
both of these cases, the DEC of the local bar association investigates 
and decides whether the case merits examination by the DAC of this 
 
27.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at arts. 8, 9, 36 ¶ 1; art. 47. 
28.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at arts. 56, ¶ 2; art. 60, ¶ 1. 
29.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 56, ¶ 1. 
30.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 56, ¶ 1. 
31.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 56, ¶ 1. 
32.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 57, ¶ 1. 
33.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 70, ¶ 1. 
34.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 65, ¶ 1. 
35.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶ 1. 
36.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶ 2. 
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local bar association.37 The JFBA also has its disciplinary enforcement 
committee (“JFBA-DEC”) and disciplinary action committee (“JFBA-
DAC”).38 The JFBA can initiate the process by causing the JFBA-DEC  
to investigate whether the case merits examination by the JFBA-
DAC.39 When a case is referred to it as discussed above, the DAC or 
JFBA-DAC decides whether the bengoshi shall be disciplined and what 
the penalty will be.40 
When the local bar association issues a ruling not to discipline the 
bengoshi concerned, the party who lodged the disciplinary request 
(“complainant”) can object to the JFBA.41 An objection can also be 
filed if the local bar association has an unreasonable delay in  
concluding the disciplinary procedure or if the complainant thinks the 
penalty is unjustly lenient.42 The objection will be examined by either 
the JFBA-DEC or JFBA-DAC. If the case has not been referred to the 
local DAC, the JFBA-DEC will examine the matter.43 If the objection 
is made against a no-discipline ruling,44 and the JFBA-DEC considers 
it appropriate to refer the matter back to the local DAC, the JFBA will 
rescind the local bar association’s no-discipline ruling and refer the 
case back to the local bar association,45 at which point that DAC shall 
examine the case.46 
If the matter has previously been referred to the local DAC,47 the 
JFBA-DAC will examine the matter.48 The JFBA will overturn the 
local bar association’s no-discipline ruling and discipline the bengoshi 
itself if the JFBA-DAC considers it appropriate to discipline the 
bengoshi.49 If the JFBA-DAC considers that there are grounds for an 
 
37.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4. 
38.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 70, ¶ 1; art. 65, ¶ 1. 
39.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 60, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4. 
40.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶¶ 5, 6; art. 60, ¶¶ 5, 6; art 65, ¶ 
2. 
41.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64, ¶ 1. 
42.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64, ¶ 1. 
43.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 1. 
44.  This would be the case when the local DEC decided not to refer the case to the local 
DAC. 
45.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 2. 
46.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 3. 
47.  The objection is made against a local DAC’s resolution of no-discipline, or on the 
ground that the penalty is unjustly lenient, or the local DAC has an unreasonable delay in 
concluding the disciplinary procedure. 
48.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-5, ¶ 1. 
49.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-5, ¶ 2. 
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objection that alleges an unjust lenience in the local bar association’s 
sanction, it will resolve to change the sanction, and the JFBA will 
cancel the local bar association’s original sanction and impose the new 
sanction on the bengoshi itself. 50 If the JFBA-DEC or JFBA-DAC 
considers there are grounds for an objection made due to unreasonable 
delay in conclusion at the local level,51  the JFBA shall order the local 
bar association to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings promptly 
and either discipline the bengoshi concerned or issue a no-discipline 
ruling.52 
The JFBA-DAC or the JFBA-DEC may resolve to dismiss or 
reject an illegitimate or groundless objection.53 The JFBA will make a 
ruling of dismissal or rejection accordingly.54 No further review can be 
sought by the complainant, except that when the JFBA-DEC dismisses 
or rejects a complainant’s objection against a local bar association’s 
no-discipline ruling, 55  the complainant can apply to the Board of 
Discipline Review [Kôki Shinsa Kai] (“BDR”) in the JFBA for a 
review.56 If the BDR considers that the review application shall be  
dismissed because it is not legitimate, the JFBA will dismiss the 
application.57 Otherwise, the BDR has to make a resolution either that 
the matter shall be remanded back to the local DAC for examination, 
which requires approval from two-thirds of its members present, or that 
it is unable to adopt such a resolution.58 In the first situation, the JFBA 
will issue a ruling to remand the case back to the original local bar 
association. 59  In the second situation, it will reject the review 
application.60 The Act requires the BDR to reflect the public opinion 
 
50.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-5, ¶ 4. 
51. Whether the JFBA-DEC or JFBA-DAC handles the objection depends on whether the 
case has been referred to the local DAC or not. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at 
art. 64-2, ¶¶ 1, 4; art. 64-5, ¶¶ 1, 3. 
52.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 4; art. 64-5, ¶ 3. 
53.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 5; art. 64-5, ¶ 5. 
54.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 5; art. 64-5, ¶ 5. 
55. These are cases that the local DEC had ruled the requests as not meriting the local 
DAC’s examination. 
56.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-3, ¶ 1. 
57.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶ 4. 
58.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶¶ 1, 5.  
59.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶ 2. 
60.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶ 5. 
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of Japan and conduct the necessary discipline review for ensuring the 
appropriateness of disciplinary procedures61 
The disciplined bengoshi can use the Administrative Appeal Act62 
to appeal to the JFBA regarding the disciplinary sanction the local bar 
association imposed.63 The JFBA-DAC will examine the matter.64 It 
may overturn the discipline sanction, 65  change the penalty or 
dismiss/reject the appeal.66 The bengoshi can institute a lawsuit at the 
Tokyo High Court if the JFBA-DAC itself imposed a discipline 
sanction67 or rejected/dismissed his or her appeal.68 The bengoshi can 
also appeal against the Tokyo High Court’s decision to the Supreme 
Court, the highest court, whose decision is final. 
2. Changes from the Previous System 
The disciplinary system described in subsection 1 above has been 
in operation since April 1, 2004, when amendments to the Act came 
into effect,69 pursuant to the justice system reform. Subject to a few 
exceptions, the pre-reform system was similar. One of the major 
changes was the enhancement of non-bengoshi’s involvement in the 
investigative stage of the disciplinary procedure. Before the reform, 
non-bengoshi members in the local DECs were non-official members; 
they could only express opinions and did not have voting or decision-
making rights.70 Now, they have voting and decision-making rights. 
Further, the BDR was established, and all of its eleven members must 
not be current or former hôsô. 71 As discussed above, when the JFBA-
DEC dismisses or rejects a complainant’s objection against a local bar 
 
61.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 71, ¶ 2. 
62. Gyôsei fufuku shinsa-hô [Administrative Appeal Act], Law No. 68 of 2014 (formerly 
Law No.160 of 1962) (Japan). 
63.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 59.  
64.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 59. 
65. In this situation, the bengoshi concerned is not disciplined. 
66.  Gyôsei fufuku shinsa-hô [Administrative Appeal Act], supra note 62, at arts. 45, 46. 
67.  This will be the situation when the JFBA-DAC: (1) upon a complainant’s objection, 
examined the matter, overturned the local bar association’s no-discipline ruling and itself 
imposed a disciplinary sanction or considered the local bar association’s penalty unjustly lenient 
and changed the sanction; or (2) examined the matter upon referral from the JFBA-DEC. 
68.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 61, ¶ 1. 
69. The amendments were adopted in 2003. 
70.  Masahiko Takanaka, 懲戒制度の改正 [The Revision of the Disciplinary System], 
54(7) 自由と正義 [LIBERTY & JUST.] 14, 16 (2003) (Japan). 
71.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 71-2; art. 71-3, ¶ 1. 
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association’s no-discipline ruling, the complainant can apply to the 
BDR in the JFBA for a review. 
Further, before the reform, dissatisfied complainants’ objections 
against local DECs’ no-discipline rulings were made to the JFBA-
DAC.72 If it confirmed the no-discipline ruling, the complainant did not 
have further recourse. Now, as described in subsection 1 above, 
complainants’ objections against local DECs’ no-discipline rulings are 
examined by the JFBA-DEC. If it rejects or dismisses the objection, the 
complainant can, as discussed above, apply to the BDR for review. 
Therefore, the reform also accorded complainants one more 
opportunity of having a local DEC’s no-discipline ruling reviewed. 
B. STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 
REGARDING NON-BENGOSHI’S PARTICIPATION 
This article argues that, despite the justice system reform, the 
bengoshi disciplinary system has structural weaknesses that may affect 
non-bengoshi’s participation in regulating legal ethics. The weaknesses 
concern the composition of the various discipline-related committees, 
the appointment of members of these committees, and a lack of further 
recourse for the complainants beyond the bar associations. These 
weaknesses are analyzed below. 
Because the JFBA rarely initiates the disciplinary procedure,73 the 
DECs are the main initial “gatekeepers.” The reform has accorded its 
non-bengoshi members with voting and decision-making rights, but the 
Act does not specify any required proportion of non-bengoshi members 
in the DECs. It only requires each DEC to have four or more committee 
members who are to be appointed from bengoshi, judges, prosecutors 
and persons of learning and experience.74 For example, the Osaka Bar 
Association DEC had only six non-bengoshi (who were two judges, 
two prosecutors and two scholars) among its eighty-six members for 
the period from October 2006 to September 2007.75 It was reported that 
the Tokyo Bar Association DEC had only nine non-bengoshi among its 
 
72.  Now, as described above, the objection is to the JFBA-DEC. 
73.  See Ishida, supra note 24, at 247. 
74.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at arts. 70-2, 70-3.  
75.  See Osaka Shunjyu Kai, 春秋会政策集 - 大阪弁護士会の独自の課題 [Osaka 
Shunjyu Kai Policy Collection – Osaka Bar Association’s unique challenge], OSAKA-SHUNJYU-
KAI, http://www.osaka-shunjyu-kai.com/seisaku/honbun7.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2017).  
336 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
109 members. 76  According to its 2017 disciplinary enforcement 
committee report, the Dai-Ichi Tokyo Bar Association had forty-nine 
bengoshi members and six non-bengoshi members in its DEC.77  If the 
situation in the other bar associations is similar, non-bengoshi are the 
minority in the DECs and can easily be out-voted. 
Systemic weakness is also found in the manner in which DEC 
members are to be appointed. The local bar association presidents make 
the appointments.78 While the appointment of judges and prosecutors 
shall be made upon recommendations from the judiciary and the public 
prosecutors’ office, the bengoshi and other committee members are 
appointed upon resolutions adopted at a general meeting of the bar 
association.79 They are therefore chosen by the bengoshi. This article 
is not suggesting that the choice is biased or that the bengoshi 
committee members tend to be lenient. However, the system, as it is, is 
not structured in a way to ensure impactful non-bengoshi participation. 
While the complainant can object against a local DEC’s no-
discipline ruling to the JFBA-DEC and, if the latter rejects or dismisses 
such objection, apply to the BDR for a review, non-bengoshi members 
are in the minority in the JFBA-DEC. Among the thirty JFBA-DEC 
members, there are only six non-bengoshi (two judges, two 
prosecutors, and two persons of learning and experience).80 The JFBA-
DEC may delegate matters to sub-committees.81 The Act only requires 
a DEC sub-committee to be composed of at least one bengoshi, one 
judge, one prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience.82 
However, the JFBA Articles require each JFBA-DEC sub-committee 
to have at least seven members who shall be four or more bengoshi, 
one judge, one prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience.83 
 
76.  See Isao Sugiyama, 綱紀・懲戒制度の概要 [Outline of the Disciplinary System], 
10(7) LIBRA 2, 3 (2010). 
77.  See TERUOKI NINOMIYA, 平成 29 年度綱紀委員会報告 [2017 REPORT OF THE 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT COMMITTEE], 第 一 東 京 弁 護 士 会 会 報  [ICHIBEN 
BULLETIN], no.542, 7 (2018). 
78.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-2, ¶ 1; art. 70-3, ¶ 1.  
79.  See Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-2, ¶ 1; art. 70-3, ¶ 1. 
Depending on the locality of the bar association, the recommendations from the public 
prosecutors’ office are from the chief public prosecutor or superintending prosecutor. 
80.  See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, art. 70, ¶ 3. (JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS) (Japan). 
81.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 70-6, ¶ 1; ARTICLES OF 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 70-3, ¶ 1.  
82.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art.  70-6, ¶ 2. 
83.  See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 70-3, ¶ 2. 
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Therefore, non-bengoshi members are always in the minority. This is 
another structural weakness, although this article is not suggesting any 
partiality or impropriety at the JFBA-DEC. 
While the complainant may apply to the BDR, which is composed 
of non-legal professionals only, to review the JFBA-DEC’s no-
discipline decision, the BDR members are appointed by the JFBA 
President upon resolution at a JFBA general meeting,84 and the BDR’s 
role is very limited. It only investigates whether the case shall be 
referred to the relevant local DAC. In other words, even when the BDR 
accepts the complainant’s objection, the case is only referred back to 
the local DAC for examination and decision. The local DAC may 
decide not to discipline the bengoshi. This is the same for cases referred 
to the DACs by the DECs or the JFBA-DEC.85 
The Act has not stipulated a required proportion of non-bengoshi 
members in the DACs. It was reported that the Tokyo Bar Association 
DAC had seven non-bengoshi among its fifteen members. 86  If the 
situations in other DACs are the same or similar, non-bengoshi would 
be the minority. That was the situation prior to the justice system 
reform. 87  Given the profession’s adamant attitude in strictly 
maintaining its self-regulation and autonomy,88 it is highly likely that 
non-bengoshi members are still in the minority now. 
 
84.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 71-3, ¶ 1. This Article is not 
suggesting that the choice of the BDR members is biased. 
85.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶ 6; art. 64-2, ¶ 3. 
86.  See Sugiyama, supra note 76, at 2, 5. 
87.  The number of bengoshi members exceeded the number of non-bengoshi members by 
one. See JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, 弁護士のあり方について [ABOUT HOW BENGOSHI 
SHOULD BE] (2000), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai28/pdfs/
28siryou1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CF2-THK3]. This was distributed at the 28th meeting of the 
Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”). 
88.  This is revealed from an analysis of the debate during the justice system reform. For 
example, at the twenty-eighth meeting of the JSRC, when questioned by a JSRC member on the 
reasons why non-bengoshi DEC members did not have voting power while bengoshi DEC-
members did, the then JFBA President replied that there was no need to change this and gave 
two reasons: first, so far, the non-bengoshi DEC members’ opinions were respected and not 
ignored and the DEC’s duties were soundly fulfilled; and, second, the bodies with final deciding 
power in a disciplinary process were the DACs whose non-bengoshi members had voting power 
and there had not been a case of the bengoshi members using their majority to push through a 
decision. See 第２８回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the 
JSRC], http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai28/28gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/NF5C-
K3GB]. Another example is the Fundamental Plan on the Reform of the Disciplinary System 
that the JFBA adopted on February 28, 2002. See 綱紀・懲戒制度の改革に関する基本方針 
[Fundamental Plan on the Reform of the Disciplinary System], JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS 
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Both the complainant and the bengoshi concerned can take the 
matter further to the JFBA-DAC if they are not satisfied with a local 
DAC’s decision. The JFBA-DAC has fifteen members: eight bengoshi, 
two judges, two prosecutors, and three persons of learning and 
experience.89 Therefore, the majority of the members are bengoshi. 
The JFBA-DAC can delegate matters to sub-committees.90 Under the 
Act,  a DAC sub-committee shall have at least one bengoshi, one judge, 
one prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience.91 However, 
the JFBA Articles require a JFBA-DAC sub-committee to have seven 
members who are composed of four bengoshi, one judge, one 
prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience.92 Therefore, the 
non-bengoshi members are also a minority in the sub-committees. 
Resolutions of the JFBA-DAC and its respective sub-committees are 
adopted by a simple majority of committee or sub-committee members 
who are present.93 Therefore, the decisions on disciplinary cases are 
mainly (if not entirely) in the hands of the bengoshi profession itself. 
Further, the JFBA-DAC’s ruling is final and binding on the 
complainant. In contrast, the disciplined bengoshi concerned can 
institute a lawsuit at the Tokyo High Court. Complainants also have no 
further recourse (for example, the courts) regarding a no-discipline 
ruling from the BDR. Both the BDR and the JFBA-DAC are 
established within the JFBA.94 Therefore, the complainants have no 
further recourse beyond the JFBA. 
C. WHY WERE THE SYSTEMIC WEAKNESSES NOT ADDRESSED 
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM? 
Under the justice system reform, changes were made to the 
bengoshi disciplinary system pursuant to the recommendations from 
 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou_be3.html 
[https://perma.cc/QBQ4-TXM8] [hereinafter JFBA Fundamental Plan]. At the very beginning 
of this document, the JFBA stated that the reform of the disciplinary system was from the 
perspective of maintaining and developing the profession’s autonomy. In other words, it argued 
for maintenance of its self-regulation. 
89.  ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 69-2. 
90.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-5; ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, 
supra note 80, at art. 69-4, ¶ 1. 
91.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-5, ¶ 2. 
92.  ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 69-4, ¶ 2.  
93.  ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 69-3, ¶ 2; art. 69-4, ¶ 3. 
94.  Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 65, ¶ 1; art. 71, ¶ 1.  
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the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) and the deliberations at 
the Legal Profession System Advisory Committee (“LPSAC”). The 
JSRC was established in 1999 to discuss the role of the justice system 
in Japan in the 21st century and make recommendations.95 It presented 
its recommendations in a report (“the JSRC Report”) on June 12, 
2001.96 This report formed the basis for the reform. To implement the 
reform, the Office for Promotion of Justice System Reform (“the 
Promotion Office”) was established in December 2001. It had eleven 
advisory committees to deliberate on the details of the reform in 
different areas. Among them, the LPSAC handled issues concerning 
the system of the legal professions, including the reform of the 
bengoshi disciplinary system. This section of the article analyzes the 
deliberations at the JSRC and the LPSAC in order to investigate 
whether the existence of the structural weaknesses discussed above was 
realized, and if they were identified, why they were not addressed in 
the reform. The analysis is based on the minutes of the deliberations 
which are available online. 
On the issue of reforming the bengoshi disciplinary system, the 
JSRC Report made a number of recommendations.  These 
recommendations included adjusting the composition of the 
membership of the bodies that carry out disciplinary procedures (such 
as increasing the number of non-bengoshi members), conferring non-
bengoshi members in the DECs with voting rights, and introducing a 
system under which the complainants can object to a review body that 
is made up of the citizens when their objections to DECs’ decisions 
have been dismissed or rejected by the JFBA. 97 It did not specify 
details on how this new review system would operate, such as the 
consequences when the new review body supports the complainant’s 
objection. Would the matter be referred to the local DAC or the JFBA-
DAC? Alternatively, would the review body have the power to consider 
 
95.  Shihôseido Kaikaku Shingikai Setchihô [The Act on the Establishment of the Justice 
System Reform Council], Law No. 68 of 1998, art. 2 (Japan).  
96.  See 司法制度改革審議会意見書  ー 21 世紀の日本を支える司法制度ー 
[Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council – For a Justice System to Support 
Japan in the 21st Century], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
sihouseido/report/ikensyo/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZBM6-J9ZM], translated in 
Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council – For a Justice System to Support Japan 
in the 21st Century, THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL http://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/
0612report.html [https://perma.cc/4T6M-QTV6]. 
97.  Id. 
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whether to discipline the bengoshi and what the sanction would be? 
The JSRC Report also did not specify any requirements about the 
manner of appointment of non-bengoshi members and their proportion 
in the DECs, DACs, JFBA-DEC, and JFBA-DAC. Finally, the JSRC 
Report did not provide the complainants any further recourse against 
decisions made by the JFBA-DAC or the new review body. 
An analysis of the minutes of the JSRC meetings98 revealed that 
there was no discussion about the manner of appointment of the 
members of the various discipline-related committees in the bar 
associations. This was probably because the pre-reform Attorney Act 
already had provisions prescribing the manner in which such members 
were to be appointed. The previous version of provisions concerning 
DACs and the JFBA-DAC were basically similar to the current version 
of the Act. There was no provision in the old Act about the appointment 
of JFBA-DEC members and non-bengoshi members in local DECs.  
This is because the pre-reform Act did not have provision on the JFBA-
DEC, and prior to the justice system reform, non-bengoshi members in 
DECs were non-official members. 99  In any case, the systemic 
weakness concerning the appointment of committee members was not 
discussed at the JSRC meetings. Therefore, not surprisingly, the JSRC 
Report is silent on this issue. It was also not discussed at the LPSAC 
meetings. This is expected because the LPSAC was given the task of 
implementing the reform pursuant to the JSRC Report. 
Regarding the membership of the various discipline-related 
committees,100 the JSRC Report merely recommended “an adjustment 
of [their] composition (such as increasing the number of non-bengoshi 
members).” There was no specification on the proportion of the 
membership. However, an analysis of the minutes of the JSRC 
meetings reveals that one JSRC member proposed that non-bengoshi 
be a majority in the committees.101 However, there was no consensus 
 
98.  See 司法制度改革審議会[Justice System Reform Council], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM 
COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/gijiroku-dex.html [https://perma.cc/XA25-
WPWP].  
99.  The system was introduced according to an agreement among the three branches of 
the legal professionals in 1979. JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 87. At most, the non-
bengoshi members could only offer their opinions, which the bengoshi members had no 
obligations to accept at all. 
100.  They are the local DECs, the local DACs, the JFBA-DEC, and the JFBA-DAC. 
101.  Toshihiro Mizuhara, a former prosecutor, brought up the issue at the 44th meeting of 
the JSRC. Mizuhara brought up the issue again at the 60th meeting on May 22, 2001 when the 
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among the JSRC members. 102  Consensus is the common Japanese 
practice of decision-making.103 Without a consensus, the matter was 
not pursued further at the JSRC. In addition, the JSRC arguably had a 
very tight time constraint. Although it impressively held sixty-six 
meetings from July 27, 1999 to June 12, 2001,104 the volume of issues 
for its deliberation was massive. Many aspects of the justice 
administration system were covered. The bengoshi system was only 
one of these aspects.105 Moreover, reform of the disciplinary system 
was just one of the many aspects of the reform of the bengoshi 
system.106 Faced with a mammoth task, the JSRC did not have much 
time for the reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system. An analysis of 
the minutes of the JSRC meetings finds that this issue was mainly 
discussed at eight meetings, 107  seven of which were half-day 
 
JSRC deliberated on the draft of the JSRC Report. See 第 44回司法制度改革審議会議事録 
[Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai44/44gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/M2LM-JBMQ] 
[hereinafter Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC]; 第 60回司法制度改革審議会議事録 
[Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai60/60gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/2DUS-97Y7] 
[hereinafter Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC]. 
102.  See Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the 60th 
Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101. 
103.  This is in contrast to the practice of the minority following the majority. Interestingly, 
at the LPSAC meetings, at least regarding the reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system, the 
practice of the minority following the majority was seemingly adopted. 
104.  See 司法制度改革審議会 審議経過 [The Progress of Deliberations at the Justice 
System Reform Council], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
sihouseido/report/ikensyo/singikeika.html [https://perma.cc/KL3N-9E9V]. 
105.  Other aspects included expansion of the population of legal professionals (judges, 
prosecutors and bengoshi), lay participation in certain criminal trials, the systems of judges and 
prosecutors respectively, the legal education and training system, criminal justice system, civil 
justice system and alternative dispute resolution. See the JSRC Report, supra note 96. 
106.  Other aspects included expansion of the scope of bengoshi’s activities, transparency 
and reasonableness of legal fees, strengthening the structure of bengoshi’s practices and 
internationalization of the profession. See id. 
107.  JSRC discussed the bengoshi disciplinary system mainly at the thirteenth meeting 
(February 22, 2000), the intensive discussion meeting (August 8, 2000), the twenty-eighth 
meeting (August 29, 2000), the twenty-ninth meeting (September 1, 2000), the thirty-third 
meeting (October 6, 2000), the forty-fourth meeting (January 23, 2001), the forty-sixth meeting 
(February 2, 2001) and sixtieth meeting (May 22, 2001). For the minutes of these meetings, see
第 13回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. 
SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai13/13gijiroku.html 
[https://perma.cc/CEB3-72Q8]; 司法制度改革審議会集中審議(第２日)議事録 [Minutes of 
the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second Day), THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/natu/natu2gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/2E7J-E284]; 
第 28回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. 
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meetings.108 In these eight meetings, other aspects of the justice system 
reform were also deliberated.109 
At the LPSAC, the Secretariat of the Promotion Office (“the 
Secretariat”) had prepared a list of items for discussion and decision, 
which was distributed at the LPSAC’s third meeting.110 On the issue of 
 
SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai28/28gijiroku.html 
[https://perma.cc/FBG4-XEGB]; 第 29 回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 29th 
Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai29/29gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/HMZ9-JFDU]; 
第 33回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. 
SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai33/33gijiroku.html 
[https://perma.cc/5XMB-NKU8]; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; 第
46回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 46th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. 
REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai46/46gijiroku.html 
[https://perma.cc/77CK-3V2L]; Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101. The 
issue had also been briefly or just barely referred to at three other meetings: the fourth, eighth, 
and twelfth meetings. For the minutes of these meetings, see 第 4回司法制度改革審議会議事
録 , [Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/991026gijiroku4.html [https://perma.cc/7KW6-44SE]; 
第 8回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 8th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. 
REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai8/0112gijiroku.html 
[https://perma.cc/74MV-AKKJ]; 第 12回司法制度改革審議会議事録, [Minutes of the 12th 
Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai12/12gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/PK3U-AFW3]. 
108.  The lengths of the seven meetings are 2:00 to 5:20 P.M. for the thirteenth meeting, 
1:30 to 4:55 P.M. for the twenty-eighth meeting, 1:30 to 4:35 P.M. for the twenty-ninth meeting, 
1:30 to 5:45 P.M. for the thirty-third meeting, 1:30 to 5:10 P.M. for the forty-fourth meeting, 
1:30 to 5:10 P.M. for the forty-sixth meeting, and 1:30 to 5:55 pm for the sixtieth meeting. The 
exception is the meeting held on August 8, 2000, which had morning and afternoon sessions. 
See Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 28th Meeting of 
the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of 
the 33rd Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra 
note 101; Minutes of the 46th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 60th Meeting 
of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second 
Day), supra note 107. 
109.  See Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 28th 
Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; 
Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the 
JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the 46th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 
60th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the 
JSRC (Second Day), supra note 107. 
110.  綱紀・懲戒手続検討のたたき台（案） [A tentative proposal for examining the 
disciplinary procedure (proposal), SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. 
REFORM, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai3/3siryo-g-8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2KU-9MMZ] [hereinafter Disciplinary Procedure Proposal]. Because of 
time constraints, the reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system was not discussed at the LPSAC 
third meeting despite being included in the original agenda. For minutes of the meeting, see 法
曹制度検討会（第３回） 議事録 [The Minutes of the 3rd LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT 
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membership of the discipline-related committees, this list did not 
contain any proposal for the non-bengoshi members to be the majority. 
It only proposed an addition of judges, prosecutors, and persons of 
learning and experience to the local DECs as official members.111 It is 
not very clear why there was no mention of the proportion of the 
membership, but it seems that the Secretariat’s list was prepared on the 
basis of the JSRC Report, the deliberations at the JSRC meetings as 
recorded in the minutes, and a document entitled the Fundamental Plan 
on the Reform of the Disciplinary System (“JFBA Fundamental 
Plan”).112 At the  LPSAC’s fourth meeting, a Secretariat official gave 
a detailed explanation about the drafting of certain items on the list.113 
Such items were in relation to the consequences when the new review 
body considered that the case should be examined by a DAC.114 The 
Secretariat had added two options to the JFBA’s suggestion115 for the 
LPSAC members to discuss and decide.116 The JFBA proposed that, 
when the new review body decided that a matter should be examined 
by the DAC, the JFBA-DEC would review the matter again and decide 
whether to refer the case to the DAC for examination. 117  In other 
words, the new review body’s aforesaid resolution has no binding 
power on the JFBA to refer the case to the DAC. Under both options 
 
OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai3/3gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/AZ9Q-MK6D]. 
111.  See Disciplinary Procedure Proposal, supra note 110. 
112. It was adopted by the JFBA at its special meeting on February 28, 2002. See JFBA 
Fundamental Plan, supra note 88. Copies of the JFBA Fundamental Plan were distributed at the 
second LPSAC meeting (held on March 12, 2002).  See 第２回配布資料⼀覧 , 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou_list.html 
[https://perma.cc/QEQ5-EFTF]. In this meeting, a JFBA Vice-President had reported about the 
JFBA’s responses to the justice system reform. For the minutes of this meeting, see 法曹制度
検討会（第 2回） 議事録, [Minutes of the 2nd LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. 
FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/
kentoukai/seido/dai2/2gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/6E2A-AQ5G] [hereinafter Minutes of the 
2nd LPSAC Meeting]. 
113.  For the minutes of the meeting, see 法曹制度検討会（第 4回） 議事録, [Minutes 
of the 4th LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. 
REFORM, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai4/4gijiroku.html 
[https://perma.cc/DFZ2-R9NJ] [hereinafter Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting]. 
114. Id. 
115. He was referring to the suggestion in the JFBA Fundamental Plan that if the new 
review body considered that the case should be examined by the DAC, the JFBA-DEC should 
re-examine whether the matter should be referred to the DAC. 
116.  See Disciplinary Procedure Proposal, supra note 110. 
117.  See JFBA Fundamental Plan, supra note 88. 
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added by the Secretariat, the new review body’s resolution that the 
matter should be examined by the DAC could have binding power on 
the JFBA. The options differed regarding the majority required for such 
a resolution : two-thirds or a simple majority.118 The official explained 
that the JSRC Report was silent on the issue of whether the new review 
body’s opinion should be binding on the JFBA and that this issue was 
an indispensable item to be discussed for inclusion in legislation on the 
new system.119 He also pointed out that, at the JSRC deliberations, 
there were opinions that the review body’s view should have binding 
power, but no JSRC members clearly advocated that binding power 
was not needed.120 They considered that this was an issue the JSRC left 
open for future examination.121 In contrast, there was debate and no 
consensus reached at the JSRC meetings regarding the requirement that 
non-bengoshi members were to be the majority in discipline-related 
committees.122 That might be a reason why the issue was not included 
in the Secretariat’s list. In any case, an analysis of the minutes of the 
LPSAC meetings indicates that no LPSAC member had raised 
arguments against the proposal in the JFBA Fundamental Plan for the 
bengoshi members to be in the majority in the discipline-related 
committees.123  This might be a relatively less important issue for the 
LPSAC members. The discussions about the bengoshi disciplinary 
system at the meetings were mainly, if not overwhelmingly, focused on 
three issues: whether the BDR’s decision should be binding on the 
JFBA, whether a simple majority or two-thirds majority was required 
and, if two-thirds majority was required, whether there should be the 
 
118.  See Disciplinary Procedure Proposal, supra note 110 
119.  See Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122.  The Secretariat official pointed this out in his explanation at the fourth LPSAC 
meeting. Id. 
123.  Minutes of the fourth, fifth, and sixth meetings of the LPSAC, see Minutes of the 4th 
LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113; 法曹制度検討会（第 5回） 議事録, [Minutes of the 5th 
LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai5/5gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/
YN3R-JCT2] [hereinafter Minutes of the 5th LPSAC Meeting]; 法曹制度検討会（第 6回） 
議事録, [Minutes of the 6th LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF 
JUST. SYS. REFORM, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai6/
6gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/5W2B-A3MM] [hereinafter Minutes of the 6th LPSAC 
Meeting]. 
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option of requiring the JFBA-DEC to re-examine the case again when 
only a simple majority was reached at the BDR.124   
Similar to the JSRC, the LPSAC also faced a time constraint in its 
deliberations. Although it was established to focus on reforming the 
system of legal professionals, the LPSAC’s work covered many issues. 
The scope included all three branches of the hôsô and, regarding the 
bengoshi, there were many issues to handle. Regarding bengoshi, the 
LPSAC’s work covered not only the disciplinary system, but also 
issues such as the liberalization of the restriction on bengoshi’s 
assumption of public posts or joining the business sector, promotion of 
the establishment of legal consultation centers, and transparency and 
reasonableness of legal fees. 125  It also included issues such as the 
strengthening of bengoshi’s practice structure, transparency of the 
administration of the bar associations, and expansion of the quasi-legal 
professions’ permitted scope of practice.126 There was a tight timeline 
for the discussions. Reform of the lawyer disciplinary system was one 
of the matters scheduled for inclusion in a bill to be submitted to the 
National Diet in its ordinary session from January to June 2003.127 To 
match this schedule, the bill was expected to be drafted and ready 
before January 2003.128 Time would also be required for the drafting 
of the bill after the discussions at the LPSAC ended. According to the 
schedule that the Secretariat proposed to the LPSAC at its third meeting 
(held on April 16, 2002), the latter had to discuss the reform of the 
lawyer disciplinary system and several other issues in four meetings to 
be held by July 22, 2002,129 although ultimately five meetings were 
 
124.  Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113; Minutes of the 5th LPSAC 
Meeting, supra note 123; Minutes of the 6th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 123. 
125.  主な検討事項と検討順序  （法曹制度検討会関係）  [Major items for 
examination and the order of examination (LPSAC-related)], http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou2.html [https://perma.cc/AR2P-ANAY]. 
126.  Id. 
127. Other matters included the liberalization of the restriction on bengoshi’s assumption 
of public posts or joining the business sector and making the legal fees transparent and 
reasonable. Id. 
128.  For the comments provided to the LPSAC by an official of the Secretariat of the 
Promotion office, see Minutes of the 2nd LPSAC Meeting, supra note 112. 
129.  See 法曹制度検討会 進行の枠組み（案） [A Plan for the Proceeding of the 
LPSAC (Proposal)], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai3/3siryo-g-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6ZPF-U78L]. 
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held from April to July in 2002. 130  In reality, the reform of the 
disciplinary system was only discussed at three half-day meetings on 
May 14, June 18, and July 9, 2002. Further, it was not the only matter 
that was discussed at these three meetings.131 The LPSAC therefore 
had a very short period of time to discuss and finalize the details of the 
reform. 
Regarding the absence of further recourse for the complainants 
beyond the JFBA, the analysis above is also applicable. The JSRC 
Report did not provide the complainants any further recourse against 
the JFBA-DAC’s decisions. There were some discussions at the JSRC 
meetings about whether there should be recourse to courts for the 
complainants. 132  A main concern was the inequity between the 
complainants and the bengoshi concerned.133 However, there was no 
consensus on the issue at the JSRC.134 It was not included by the 
Secretariat as an agenda item for the LPSAC meetings and there was 
not much discussion on this issue at the meetings.135 
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING JAPAN 
In Japan, the justice system reform has enhanced non-lawyer 
participation in the lawyer disciplinary process. However, the system 
has structural weaknesses. They are the composition of the various 
discipline-related committees, the manner in which the members of 
 
130.  For the list of the meetings, see 法 曹 制 度 検 討 会  [LPSAC], 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/10seido.html [https://perma.cc/Z6GN-
ME68]. 
131.  For meeting minutes, see Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113; Minutes 
of the 5th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 123; Minutes of the 6th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 123. 
132.  For example, see Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second 
Day), supra note 107; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101. 
133.  For example, see Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second 
Day), supra note 107. 
134.  See id.; see also Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes 
of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101.  
135. At the fourth LPSAC meeting, an LPSAC member did raise up the issue of no further 
recourse for the complainants after JFBA-DAC. A JFBA Vice-President who attended that 
meeting responded that under the option that the JFBA proposed, a complainant would already 
have the request heard four times, by the local DEC, the JFBA-DEC, the BDR, and then the 
JFBA-DEC again, and this was more than the three trials available in civil litigations in courts. 
The LPSAC member did not accept the explanation but there was no debate on the issue at the 
meeting afterwards. For minutes of the fourth LPSAC meeting, see Minutes of the 4th LPSAC 
Meeting, supra note 113. For minutes of the 5th LPSAC Meeting and the 6th LPSAC Meeting, 
see supra note 123.  
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these committees are to be appointed, and the lack of further recourse 
for the complainants beyond the JFBA. 
The issue of appointment of committee members was not 
discussed at the JSRC meetings. The other two weaknesses were 
pointed out at JSRC meetings, but there was no consensus among the 
members. Consensus, a traditional Japanese practice of decision-
making, was adopted at the JSRC regarding the reform of the lawyer 
disciplinary system. As a result, the JSRC Report has not specified 
reform in these respects. When decisions depend on consensus, 
compromises will commonly be needed and negotiations will be 
lengthy. However, the JSRC faced a mammoth task, resulting in very 
little time for the issue of reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system. 
That could also be a factor contributing to the lack of specific and 
necessary details on the operation of the BDR in the JSRC Report. 
To implement the recommendations in the JSRC Report regarding 
the system of legal professionals, which included reform of the lawyer 
disciplinary system, the LPSAC was established to advise on the details 
for relevant legislation. Because the LPSAC worked on the basis of the 
JSRC Report and the deliberations at the JSRC meetings, two of the 
three systemic weaknesses were not debated at the LPSAC meetings, 
and the other weakness was only briefly raised and discussed. As 
analyzed above, its deliberation concerning reform of the bengoshi 
disciplinary system was mainly focused on the operation of the BDR, 
namely whether its resolution would be binding on the JFBA, how 
much of a majority such resolution would require, and whether there 
would be an additional option of requiring the JFBA-DEC to re-
examine the case. LPSAC was faced with the task of completing this 
significant gap in the JSRC Report, but it nevertheless had a tight 
timeline to provide details for the drafting of the relevant bill regarding 
this issue and other issues. 
As stated in the JSRC Report, the aim of the reform of the 
bengoshi disciplinary system was to secure the people’s trust in the 
bengoshi profession, all legal professionals, and the whole justice 
system by making the procedure transparent, prompt, and effective.136 
Enhancing the people’s involvement or participation in the procedure 
was one of the means to achieve this aim. Enhancing the impact of non-
bengoshi on the disciplinary system was not the focus. Even when the 
issue of providing complainants an opportunity to seek judicial review 
 
136. For the JSRC Report, see supra note 96. 
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of the JFBA-DAC’s decisions was discussed at the JSRC meetings, the 
debate was mainly from the perspective of mitigating the inequity 
between the bengoshi concerned and the complainants, in that judicial 
review was available to the former but not the latter. 
Further, at the beginning of the fourth LPSAC meeting, the first 
LPSAC meeting that deliberated on reform of the lawyer disciplinary 
system, a JFBA Vice-President gave a presentation before the LPSAC 
members commenced their discussions. 137  In the presentation, he 
separated reform measures into three categories: transparency, 
promptness, and effectiveness. He explained the measures that the 
JFBA Fundamental Plan proposed for achieving each of these 
categories.138 The reform measures of according voting rights to non-
bengoshi DEC members, making them official members, and 
establishing the BDR were categorized as having the goal of securing 
the transparency of the system.139 There were no definite opposing 
voices from the LPSAC. 140  The criteria of transparency is easily 
fulfilled if non-bengoshi are involved in the system, irrespective of the 
extent of such involvement. 
 
III. SINGAPORE 
A. The Lawyer Disciplinary System in Singapore 
In Singapore, the current form of the disciplinary system for 
advocates and solicitors 141  is a multi-step process that involves 
different stakeholders, including clients, lawyers, the Law Society, and 
 
137.  See Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. At the fifth meeting, a LPSAC member had discussed about the BDR from the 
perspective of effectiveness of the disciplinary system but he was not addressing the 
categorization by the JFBA Vice-President and had not specifically criticized or opposed such 
categorization. For minutes of the fifth LPSAC meeting, see Minutes of the 5th LPSAC Meeting, 
supra note 123. For minutes of the other two LPSAC Meetings (the 4th and the 6th LPSAC 
Meetings), see Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113 and Minutes of the 6th LPSAC 
Meeting, supra note 123.  
141.  A different process, helmed by the Chief Justice, is used for legal service officers and 
non-practicing solicitors. Legal Profession Act of 1966 (revised 2009), ch. 161, § 82A (Sing.), 
and regulated non-practitioners, § 82B. This Article is based on the Legal Profession Act of 
1966 (revised 2009), ch. 161 (Sing.).  References to this version are indicated by “Legal 
Profession Act,” and other versions are indicated by addition of the year. 
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the courts. The system utilizes persons with different backgrounds to 
review and determine complaints, including judges, lawyers, lay 
persons, and legal service officers, the latter being legally trained 
individuals with government posts in the Singapore Legal Service.142 
The stages of the disciplinary process that incorporate lay persons are 
not public, and there is no publicly available information about how lay 
persons impact the disciplinary process. Therefore, this portion of the 
article focuses on the factors that led Singapore to adopt lay person 
participation.  This history suggests that in addition to exerting control 
over the bar’s input into the legal system, incorporating lay persons and 
legal service officers was meant to shift Singapore away from self-
regulation and toward regulation by a wider range of stakeholders. In 
particular, lay persons were introduced to institutionalize consideration 
of consumer interests. In doing so, Singapore overcame the aversion to 
lay person ignorance and incompetence displayed when it limited and 
then abolished the jury system in 1960 and 1969. 
B. Current Disciplinary System 
All Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers registered with the 
Legal Services Regulatory Authority are regulated by the Law Society, 
and they are required to comply with the relevant portions of the 
professional conduct rules, including the Legal Profession Act143 and 
the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules.144 Any person, not 
just a client, can submit a complaint about a lawyer’s conduct in breach 
of professional rules, and such complaints are submitted to the Law 
Society,145 after which the matter is investigated and pursued under the 
Legal Profession Act. Because all advocates and solicitors and legal 
service officers are officers of the Supreme Court, 146  the Supreme 
Court has ultimate disciplinary jurisdiction over them. 147  This 
supervision is reflected in various aspects of the Chief Justice’s role in 
the disciplinary procedure and the final stage of the most serious 
 
142.  Legal Profession Act, § 2 (“‘Legal Service Officer’ means an officer in the Singapore 
Legal Service.”). 
143.  Legal Profession Act. 
144.  Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 S 706/2015 (Sing.). 
145. Legal Profession Act, § 85(1). 
146. See id. § 82(1). 
147. LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND 
INNOVATIONS 365 (E. Ann Black & Gary F. Bell eds., 2011). 
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disciplinary cases, a hearing before the Court of Three Judges in the 
Supreme Court. Under the common disciplinary framework adopted in 
2015, all Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers practicing law in 
Singapore, referred to as “regulated legal practitioners,”148 are subject 
to the same overall professional disciplinary processes.149  This Article 
focuses on the disciplinary process as it applies to advocates and 
solicitors, the title for Singapore lawyers.150 
The disciplinary process in Singapore encompasses four main 
stages of increasing gravity: the Review Committee and the Inquiry 
Committee, which take place under the supervision of the Law Society; 
the Disciplinary Tribunal;151 and the final stage of the Court of Three 
Judges, a hearing conducted by the Supreme Court. 152  To proceed 
under the disciplinary process, complaints need to meet certain formal 
requirements, e.g., be in writing and include information about other 
complaints regarding the advocate and solicitor, as relevant.153 Subject 
to a few exceptions,154 complaints received by the Law Society that 
comply with these requirements must be referred by the Council of the 
Law Society to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel.155 The Inquiry Panel 
contains the pool of lawyers and lay persons who can be called upon to 
serve on the Inquiry Committee that investigates complaints,156 if the 
complaint gets that far. 
In addition to complaints from clients, the Council of the Law 
Society may refer a matter to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel on its 
own motion.157 Any judicial office holder, the Attorney-General, the 
Director of Legal Services, or the Singapore Institute of Legal 
 
148. Legal Profession Act, § 2(1) (“‘[R]egulated legal practitioner’ means an advocate and 
solicitor or a regulated foreign lawyer.”). 
149. See SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF LAW, CIRCULAR ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
LEGAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY, ¶ 5(a)(ii) (2015) (Sing.). 
150.  Legal Profession Act, § 2(1). 
151. The currently constituted “Disciplinary Tribunal” plays the same role but differs from 
the “Disciplinary Committee” of earlier versions of the Legal Profession Act; the change to the 
current “Disciplinary Tribunal” was made in 2008 in the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 
2008. See Act Supplement No. 19 § 34 (2008) (Sing.).  The text of this Article uses both terms, 
as contained in the legislation under discussion. 
152. See Legal Profession Act, § 98(7), which refers to a “court of 3 Judges.” 
153. See id. § 85(1). 
154. See id. §§ 85(1A), 85(4A). 
155. See id. § 85(1A). 
156. The Inquiry Panel is comprised of “advocates and solicitors (whether in practice or 
not), regulated foreign lawyers and lay persons.”  Id. § 84(1). 
157. See id. § 85(2). 
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Education may also refer information touching upon the conduct of a 
regulated legal practitioner to the Law Society.158 In response to these 
referrals, the Council must refer the matter to the Inquiry Panel 
Chairman,159 or if the “judicial office holder, the Attorney-General, the 
Director of Legal Services or the Institute . . . requests that the matter 
be referred to a Disciplinary Tribunal, apply to the Chief Justice to 
appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal.”160 
Where a complaint is referred to the Chairman of the Inquiry 
Panel, the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Inquiry Panel must 
constitute a Review Committee within two weeks. 161  The Review 
Committee comprises two persons: 
• A chairman, either the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of 
the Inquiry Panel, or “an advocate and solicitor member 
of the Inquiry Panel of not less than twelve years’ 
standing”; and 
• If the subject of the complaint is: 
o an advocate and solicitor, “a Legal Service Officer 
who has not less than ten years’ experience”; or 
o a regulated foreign lawyer, “a member of the 
Inquiry Panel who is a regulated foreign lawyer of 
not less than ten years’ standing.”162 
Lay persons are absent from this early filter stage of proceedings. 
The two-person Review Committee decides if the complaint has 
any substance that must be referred for further inquiry.163 The Review 
Committee can require the complainant or lawyer to answer any 
inquiry or to furnish any record that the Review Committee considers 
relevant.164 The Review Committee is required to start its review of the 
complaint within two weeks of the constitution of the Review 
Committee.165 If the Review Committee unanimously determines that 
the complaint or information is “frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or 
 
158. See id. § 85(3). 
159. See id. § 85(3)(a). 
160. Id. § 85(3)(b). 
161. See id. § 85(6). 
162. See id. 
163. See Discipline Process, THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE, 
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/Lawyer-Regulation/Discipline-Process [https://perma.cc/J3HE-
TS9A]. 
164. See Legal Profession Act, § 85(7). 
165. See id. § 85(6). 
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lacking in substance,” it can direct the Council to dismiss the matter, 
providing reasons for the dismissal.166 The Council must accept this 
decision of the Review Committee and is required to write to the 
complainant and the lawyer within seven days, stating the reasons why 
the complaint was dismissed.167 If the complaint is not dismissed, it is 
referred back to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel for the second stage, 
where an Inquiry Committee is appointed to conduct an inquiry into the 
complaint.168  
The procedure at the Review Committee level makes some 
actions mandatory. For example, the Council is required to accept a 
Review Committee’s unanimous determination “that the complaint or 
information is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in 
substance” and should be dismissed.169 The procedure imposes time 
limits as well. The Chairman of the Inquiry Panel must constitute a 
Review Committee for complaints within two weeks,170 the Review 
Committee must begin its review of the complaint within two weeks of 
the constitution of the Review Committee,171 and where the Review 
Committee determines that the complaint should be dismissed, the 
Council is required within seven days to write to the complainant and 
the lawyer, stating the reasons why the complaint was dismissed.172 
The second stage of the disciplinary process is the Inquiry 
Committee. If the Review Committee refers the complaint or 
information back to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel, the Inquiry 
Committee must be constituted within three weeks. 173  The Inquiry 
Committee is assembled by the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the 
Inquiry Panel,174 and is comprised of a Chairman, who is an advocate 
and solicitor from the Inquiry Panel of not less than 12 years’ 
standing, 175 an advocate and solicitor176 and lay person 177 from the 
 
166. Id. § 85(8)(a). 
167. See id. § 85(9). 
168. See id. § 85(10). 
169. Id. § 85(8)(a); § 85(9)(a). 
170. See id. § 85(6). 
171. See id.  
172. See id. § 85(9). 
173. See id. § 85(10). 
174.  See id. 
175.  See id, § 10(a). 
176.  See id, § 10(b)(i). 
177.  See id, § 10(c). 
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Inquiry Panel,178 and a Legal Services Officer of not less than 10 years’ 
experience.179   
The members of the Inquiry Panel as well as the Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman of the Inquiry Panel are appointed by the Chief 
Justice.180 The overall number of persons serving on the Inquiry Panel 
is determined within the discretion of the Chief Justice.181 The Chief 
Justice may also remove persons from the Inquiry Panel and appoint 
persons to fill vacancies on the Inquiry Panel.182 
The Inquiry Panel is comprised of “advocates and solicitors 
(whether in practice or not), regulated foreign lawyers and lay 
persons.” 183  Both advocates and solicitors and regulated foreign 
lawyers must have not less than seven years’ standing,184 while the 
Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Inquiry Panel must have not 
less than twelve years’ standing as an advocate and solicitor.185 
In addition to qualifications for regulated legal practitioners and 
legal service officers, the Legal Profession Act addresses lay person 
qualifications. According to section 2(1), a “‘lay person,’ in relation to 
the Inquiry Panel or an Inquiry Committee, means an architect, an 
accountant, a banker, a company director, an insurer, a professional 
engineer, a medical practitioner or any other person (not being an 
advocate and solicitor or a Legal Service Officer) who meets such 
criteria as may be approved by the Chief Justice and the Attorney-
General.”186 
The Inquiry Committee has deadlines for beginning its work and 
reporting its findings. The Inquiry Committee shall commence its 
inquiry within two weeks of its constitution. 187  The deadlines for 
reporting its findings to the Council depend on whether the Inquiry 
Panel has called for any information from the lawyer.188 If the Inquiry 
Committee has decided not to call the lawyer to explain or answer 
 
178. See id. § 84(1). 
179.  See id. § 85(10)(d). 
180. See id. §§ 84(1), 84(5). 
181. See id. § 84(1). 
182. See id. § 84(4). 
183. See id. § 84(1). 
184. See id. § 84(2). 
185. See id. § 84(5). 
186. Id. § 2. 
187. See id. § 86(1). 
188.  See id. 
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allegations, the Inquiry Committee has two months after the date of its 
appointment; in any other case, it must issue its report no later than two 
weeks after its last meeting or “three months after the date of its 
appointment, whichever is earlier.”189 If the Inquiry Committee cannot 
report its findings within this period due to complexity or serious 
difficulties, it can apply to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel for an 
extension of the time,190 which if granted cannot extend beyond six 
months from the date the Inquiry Committee was appointed. 191 
However, no “application for an extension of time may be made to the 
Chairman of the Inquiry Panel” after two months following the date of 
the appointment of the Inquiry Committee.192 Compared to the Review 
Committee stage, the Inquiry Committee stage is subject to more 
performance deadlines. 
While conducting the inquiry, the Inquiry Committee can appoint 
persons to assist in making inquiries, require a person to produce for 
inspection any books, documents, or papers related to the inquiry, and 
require any person including the advocate and solicitor to give 
information in relation to such books, documents, or papers.193 When 
an Inquiry Committee decides that an advocate and solicitor should 
answer allegations, the Inquiry Committee shall: deliver a copy of the 
complaint or information to the advocate and solicitor, together with 
any statutory declarations or affidavits that have been made in support; 
give the advocate and solicitor an opportunity to provide any written 
explanation he may wish to offer or advise if he wishes to be heard by 
the Inquiry Committee; and give due consideration to any explanation 
provided.194 
“Any questions arising at any meeting of an Inquiry Committee 
shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members of the 
Committee,” with the Chairman of the Inquiry Committee having a 
second vote to break a tie.195 It is required that all “[a]ll the members 
of an Inquiry Committee shall be present to constitute a quorum for a 
meeting of the Inquiry Committee.”196 The procedure at the Inquiry 
 
189. See id.  
190. See id. § 86(2). 
191. See id. § 86(3). 
192. See id. § 86(4). 
193. See id. § 86(12). 
194. See id. § 86(6). 
195. See id. § 85(14). 
196. See id. § 85(15). 
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Committee suggests that lay person opinion and participation have 
equal weight with the opinions and participation of lawyers and legal 
service officers, except in the case of a tied vote. 
The Inquiry Committee can essentially make one of three 
decisions. If the Inquiry  Committee is satisfied that there are no 
grounds for disciplinary action, it is required to make that report to the 
Council and state the reasons.197 If the Inquiry Committee determines 
that no formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal is required but 
that some measures are warranted, it is required to make appropriate 
recommendations, 198  such as alternatives including a penalty 
appropriate to the misconduct committed, 199  or a reprimand or 
warning.200 Lastly, it can recommend that a formal investigation by a 
Disciplinary Tribunal is required, together with the preferred 
charges.201 
The Inquiry Committee report goes to the Council of the Law 
Society, who must decide the next step within one month of receipt, a 
decision which can include referral back to the Inquiry Committee for 
further consideration.202 If the Council determines that there should be 
a formal investigation, the Council has to “apply to the Chief Justice to 
appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal which shall hear and investigate the 
matter.”203 If the Inquiry Committee determines that a Disciplinary 
Tribunal is not necessary, but the Council disagrees, the Council may 
request the Chief Justice to appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal.204  
In the third, more serious stage of disciplinary proceedings, the 
Disciplinary Tribunal is appointed by the Chief Justice. 205  A 
Disciplinary Tribunal can be appointed to review a particular complaint 
or for a fixed period of time, within the Chief Justice’s discretion.206 
Unlike the Inquiry Committee, where the Chairman of the Inquiry 
Panel is required to appoint a committee that includes a lay person,207 
 
197.  See id. §§ 86(5), 86(7)(b)(v). 
198.  See id. § 86(7)(b)(i)-(iv). 
199. See id. § 86(7)(b)(i). 
200. See id. § 86(7)(b)(ii). 
201. See id. § 86(7)(a). 
202. See id. § 87(1). 
203. Id. § 89(1). 
204. See id. § 87(2)(b). 
205. See id. § 90(1). 
206. See id. § 90(2). 
207. See id. § 85(10)(c). 
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lay person participation is not required in the Disciplinary Tribunal and 
there is no mechanism for arranging it.  The Disciplinary Tribunal 
comprises a President, who is a Senior Judge of the Supreme Court, or 
has been a Judge or Judicial Officer of the Supreme Court, or is an 
advocate and solicitor who is also a Senior Counsel, 208  and as 
applicable, either an advocate and solicitor or regulated foreign lawyer 
of not less than twelve years’ standing.209  
Proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal are more formal 
than the preceding stages of the disciplinary process. Any person giving 
evidence to the Disciplinary Tribunal shall be legally bound to tell the 
truth, 210  and in addition to the procedure articulated in the Legal 
Profession Act,211 subsidiary legislation sets out additional procedures 
to be used. 212  A Disciplinary Tribunal is required to work 
“expeditiously” but is not subject to the string of deadlines applicable 
to the Inquiry Committee, although the Law Society “may apply to the 
Chief Justice for directions to be given to the Disciplinary Tribunal if 
the Disciplinary Tribunal fails to make any finding and determination 
within six months from the date of its appointment.” 213  The 
Disciplinary Tribunal makes one of three determinations regarding 
advocates and solicitors: that no cause exists for the more severe 
disciplinary actions under section 83 of the Legal Profession Act of 
being struck off the roll, suspended for a period of time, or censured; 
that the advocate and solicitor should be ordered to pay a penalty, 
reprimanded, and/or comply with remedial measures; or that there is 
sufficient basis for the most severe disciplinary actions under section 
83 of the Legal Profession Act. 214  If the Disciplinary Tribunal 
determines that “sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under 
section 83,”215 the Law Society “shall without further direction” apply 
for an order for the advocate and solicitor to show cause why the 
advocate and solicitor should not be punished. 216  Proceedings 
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regarding the order to show cause are “heard by a court of 3 Judges of 
the Supreme Court,” from which there is no appeal.217 
The above review of the Singapore disciplinary procedure 
illustrates three distinctive characteristics. First, in addition to 
advocates and solicitors, lay persons and legal service officers are 
involved in the second stage of the investigatory and decision-making 
process, the Inquiry Committee. Currently, while lay person views 
carry roughly equivalent weight at the Inquiry Committee, lay persons 
are absent from the first stage Review Committee and the third stage 
Disciplinary Tribunal. Second, the portions of the disciplinary process 
occurring under Law Society supervision are subject to strict time 
deadlines, and a number of actions are mandatory under the Legal 
Profession Act. Third, the Supreme Court has considerable oversight 
powers. Why does the disciplinary process contain these 
characteristics, and what are the goals of the current procedure? The 
answer lies in the shift in Singapore away from self-regulation and 
toward more control of the disciplinary process by stakeholders other 
than advocates and solicitors. 
C. EXPANDING PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCIPLINARY 
PROCESS FOR LAY PERSONS AND LEGAL SERVICE OFFICERS 
VIA THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 
The predecessor to the Legal Profession Act was the Advocates 
and Solicitors Ordinance.218 Mr. Justice P. Coomaraswamy drafted the 
first Legal Profession Act,219 which came into force in 1966.220 Prior 
to passage in the late fifties, only 15-20 members out of a Bar of about 
180 would attend the Annual General Meeting (“AGM”), at which the 
Law Society Committee, the entity that investigated and determined 
punishment for professional breaches, was elected.221 The implication 
was that anyone who could persuade twenty sympathizers to attend an 
AGM would be able to dictate the composition of the Committee.222 
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Justice Coomaraswamy was a member of the 1963-64 Committee.223 
At the time, there were rumors about someone, who was anticipating 
disciplinary proceedings against him, moving to pack the meeting so 
that the Committee for 1964-65 would be sympathetic to him. 224 
Apparently this plan did not come to pass, but the incident led Justice 
Coomaraswamy to draft the first version of the Legal Profession Act.225 
Under the 1966 Legal Profession Act, investigation and 
disciplinary measures were primarily in the hands of advocates and 
solicitors of the Law Society, with a final review provided by the 
Supreme Court. At this point, the investigation process had two main 
stages. The Council of the Society was required to appoint a standing 
five-person Inquiry Committee, comprised entirely of current or former 
members of the Council, at the start of each year.226 Upon receiving 
any complaint against a lawyer, the Council would direct the complaint 
to this Committee, which would then investigate the complaint and 
report its findings to the Council.227 The Council would then determine 
whether a formal investigation would be undertaken by a Disciplinary 
Committee or would take other action, 228  with members of the 
Disciplinary Committee appointed by the Chief Justice “from time to 
time.”229 Each Disciplinary Committee was made up of between three 
and five members, 230  and its function was to conduct a formal 
investigation of the complaint referred to it by the Council. At the end 
of its investigation, the Disciplinary Committee would submit its report 
to the Chief Justice and to the Law Society, and upon request would 
provide the report to the advocate and solicitor and the complainant.231 
If the Disciplinary Committee determined that “due cause exist[ed] for 
disciplinary action” against the lawyer concerned, the Society was 
required to proceed with the application for a show cause order under 
section 102 of the Act.232 
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Significant amendments were made to the Legal Profession Act 
in 1986 due to perceived problems with the way the Law Society 
handled complaints and to ensure that persons who governed the legal 
profession were persons of integrity. 233  Some of the problems 
regarding the handling of complaints, as noted by the Select Committee 
assigned to consider the proposed legislative changes, were: 
• Occasions in which investigations took an inordinately 
long time; 
• “[I]ncomprehensible findings” by the Disciplinary 
Committees of the Law Society in some cases; and 
• Instances when apparently unprofessional behavior was 
not taken to task by the Inquiry Committee of the Law 
Society, which had dismissed the complaint after its 
preliminary investigations. 234 
Prior to the 1986 amendments, procedures were such that once a 
complaint was before an Inquiry Committee, “a shroud of secrecy 
descend[ed] over the whole [proceeding],”235 because all inquiries by 
the Law Society then were strictly confidential.236 This confidentiality 
allowed the public to conclude that the Law Society was trying to 
protect its own members by covering up for them.237 In the case of 
Joseph Linus, Mr. Linus was brought before a Disciplinary Committee 
for contravening the Solicitor’s Account Rules through 
misappropriating client money and permitting an employee who was 
not legally trained to act as an advocate and solicitor. 238 A Disciplinary 
Committee was appointed on June 29, 1983, but their report was not 
submitted until June 4, 1985, almost two years later. 239  Despite 
establishing the facts alleged against Linus, the Disciplinary 
Committee said that there was no cause of sufficient gravity for 
disciplinary action and merely recommended a reprimand. 240  The 
Linus case also compared poorly with the case of Thomas Tham, an 
advocate and solicitor who allegedly committed criminal breach of 
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trust.241 On January 20, 1986, Tham’s client lodged a report with the 
police instead of the Law Society. 242  Police investigations were 
completed in seven months, and Tham was charged in court on 
September 25, 1986.243 In total, there were eleven cases brought up by 
then Attorney-General, Tan Boon Teik, to illustrate the severity of 
delays in investigation time.244 
At the time Singapore was determining how to improve its 
attorney discipline procedure, there was a precedent outside of 
Singapore regarding lay person participation. The Select Committee 
noted that as of August 27, 1986, England and Wales had a Solicitors’ 
Complaints Bureau, a body run by lay persons and entirely separate 
from the Law Society, which dealt with complaints against 
solicitors.245 The fact that the Discipline Tribunal of the Solicitors’ 
Tribunal in England and Wales had lay representatives since 1975 also 
served as a support for Singapore to adopt the use of lay persons in the 
advocate and solicitor disciplinary system. 246  Unlike the Solicitors 
Complaints’ Bureau, where investigation and adjudication of 
complaints against solicitors were dominated by lay members, the 1986 
amendment to the Legal Profession Act sought to adopt a more lawyer-
friendly approach by including lay members as well as members of the 
Legal Service.247 
Lay participation was formally introduced into the Singapore 
legal disciplinary system through the Legal Profession (Amendment) 
Act of 1986.248 Prior to this amendment, the people who sat on the 
Inquiry Committee and Disciplinary Committee were all lawyers.249 
The main reason for introducing a degree of lay representation in the 
disciplinary system was to assure the general public who dealt with 
legal practitioners that standards were maintained250 and to “stop the 
belief that self-help and mutual forgiveness [was] the way lawyers 
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maintain[ed] standards of professional conduct.”251 It was important 
for the legal profession in Singapore to consider the public interest and 
maintain standards and the image of the Bar.252 Singapore academic 
Tan Yock Lin stated that lay representation was introduced to “ensure 
that the client’s viewpoint [was] taken into account in the investigation 
and . . . provide a measure of transparency and public accountability in 
the investigation.”253 
The composition of the Inquiry Committee was changed to 
include two advocates and solicitors, one lay person, and one legal 
officer.254 The Disciplinary Committee was changed to “(a) a person 
from a panel of not more than 5 persons appointed by the Chief Justice 
being retired judges or persons who have had not less than 12 years’ 
experience as advocates and solicitors; (b) an advocate and solicitor 
who has in force a practising certificate; (c) a legal officer who has at 
least 10 years’ experience; and (d) a member of the Inquiry Panel who 
is a lay person.”255 However, laypersons on Disciplinary Committees 
had no right to vote and were not required to be present at every 
meeting, nor were they required to be “personally present to constitute 
a quorum for the transaction of any business.” 256  As observed by 
Singapore academic Jeffrey Pinsler, this took into account “the Law 
Society’s objection that persons without a legal background would not 
have the necessary understanding of the procedures and matters of law 
which arise at this stage of the process,” although lay persons would be 
“entitled to observe and participation  stresses the new priority of 
openness.”257   The purpose of including the new kinds of members 
was to remove grounds for cynicism and criticism of the profession’s 
disciplinary processes as a whole, and to show that the public interest 
was of some importance in the Disciplinary Committee’s decision.258 
Regarding the legal service officers, it was hoped that they would bring 
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to bear experience in investigation and judge issues more objectively, 
as they would be less bothered with the need to generate fees and would 
not be open to the same temptations.259 
The reasons for including lay persons and legal service officers in 
the disciplinary process as they appear in the Select Committee Report 
are relatively clear. They were inserted to act as additional watchdogs 
for the disciplinary process and to represent the “consumer interest”.260 
This view of how lay persons would interact with lawyers suggests that 
lay persons could at some level hold their own against lawyers, but this 
view contrasts sharply with the view of roughly twenty years earlier 
that lay persons should not act as jurors in criminal proceedings. As a 
legacy of its colonial history, Singapore had used jury trials for all 
criminal offenses, but in 1960 Singapore restricted the use of juries, 
and abolished it altogether in 1969, 261  primarily because of the 
perceived ignorance and unsuitability of jurors. The first step in 1959-
60 cut back on the use of juries, from criminal offenses generally to 
only capital cases. At the second reading of the relevant bill in 
Parliament in 1959, then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew noted that jury 
trials increased the importance of lawyer skill and agility in 
determinations of guilt or innocence, and that in reality the jury was not 
comprised of one’s peers but rather the English-educated population.262 
The matter was referred to a Select Committee for further 
consideration. In this context, some witnesses expressed faith in the 
jury’s ability to bring common sensibilities to justice263 and asserted 
the value of juror participation in the administration of justice,264 but 
there was discussion of jurors being unduly swayed by counsel265 and 
of verdicts that had gone counter to judicial directions. 266  When 
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combined with the perceived need to bring the law of Singapore in line 
with that of Malaysia,267 the Select Committee voted in favor of the 
bill,268 and the bill was passed into law.269 
Ten years after cutting back jury trials, the government sought to 
abolish the jury entirely. At this point in Singapore, there were “no 
opposition members in Parliament, and it was thus unlikely that the bill 
would be ‘blocked.’” 270  Then-Minister for Law and National 
Development, Mr. E.W. Barker, asserted the unreliability of juries and 
stated that judges would provide more predictable verdicts. 271 The 
Prime Minister addressed Parliament again on the issue, noting that 
jury members seemed overwhelmed with the responsibility of finding 
defendants guilty if they knew the death penalty would follow,272 and 
in the face of expert psychiatric evidence were either too impressed or 
confused.273 Again, a Select Committee was convened. Statements in 
favor of the jury were submitted, but the Committee also heard 
evidence that juries were not up the task,274 inefficient, and corrupted 
or frightened into giving the wrong verdict.275 The Select Committee 
reviewed the verdict in the so-called Peeping Tom case, in which the 
jury convicted the defendant of culpable homicide, and not murder, by 
a vote of four to three.276 However, the verdict was flawed as five 
persons were required for a verdict in the group of seven. 277  The 
mistake was only discovered later, when nothing could be done.278 
There was also confusion regarding the difference between “majority” 
and “unanimous.”279 Per the Deputy Registrar of the High Court, many 
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jurors could not read the oath properly.280 Another problem was that 
superstitions prevailed among jurors, such as the belief that a pregnant 
woman should not pass the death sentence while carrying a child.281 
Representative jurors from the Peeping Tom case asserted that working 
class people were not up to the task, which should be left to 
intellectuals.282 At the Third Reading of the Bill, Barker observed that 
the Select Committee had confirmed the government’s view,283 and the 
bill abolishing the jury was passed.284 In an oft-quoted statement from 
his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew stated that he “had no faith in a system 
that allowed the superstition, ignorance, biases, and prejudices of seven 
jurymen to determine guilt or innocence.”285 
When changes to the lawyer disciplinary process via the Legal 
Profession Act were debated in 1986, the 1969 abolition of the jury was 
mentioned in Select Committee proceedings in passing.286 Then Prime 
Minister Lee Kwan Yew noted that the reason juries were abolished 
was that “Singaporeans were not willing to take the decision that would 
lead to severe punishment for the person they are asked to sit in 
judgment over.” 287  The view of laypersons as incompetent was no 
longer put forward, and in its place was a mixed characterization: lay 
persons could act as consumer watchdogs, but they were limited by 
their unfamiliarity with the law. 
In its submission to the 1986 Select Committee regarding changes 
to the lawyer disciplinary process, the Council of the Law Society of 
Singapore did not object to some participation by lay persons, but it 
defended its record of self-regulation, noting that due to confidentiality 
of disciplinary proceedings the public only heard about the most 
serious cases.288 On the assumption “that public participation would 
result in a greater awareness of what the profession does in this field 
and therefore greater public confidence in the profession, it is to be 
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welcomed in principle.”289 However, the Council was concerned that 
lay persons lacked legal knowledge.290 This concern led the Council to 
object to the inclusion of lay persons on Disciplinary Committees, in 
view of the need to understand rules of evidence and procedure relevant 
at that stage.291 
In its submission to the Select Committee, The Law Club of the 
National University of Singapore agreed with the objective of 
providing wider representation in disciplinary proceedings, 292  and 
argued that lay representatives should be incorporated into the Inquiry 
Panel 293  as well as the Disciplinary Committee, which would help 
“[safe-guard] consumer interest and [minimize] the risk of the 
profession forwarding its interest at the expense of public interest.”294 
Agreement regarding the ability of lay people to represent the 
consumer interest and be a “watchdog” over lawyers,295 even though it 
was conceded that a “lay representative would have to be guided by the 
legal minds on questions involving intricacies of the law” if they were 
included on the Disciplinary Committee,296 is a considerable step from 
jettisoning jurors from the criminal process because they are ignorant 
and swayed by lawyers. The Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 1986 
arguably addressed the issues raised by inclusion of lay persons in the 
disciplinary process, in part by establishing qualifications for being a 
lay person, via the definition of a lay person in connection with an 
Inquiry Panel and Disciplinary Committee. 297  Lay persons were 
required to have the profession of “architect, accountant, banker, 
company director, insurer, professional engineer, medical practitioner 
or a person who possesses such other qualifications as may be approved 
by the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General.” 298   Lay persons 
involved in the disciplinary process would therefore have an education 
as well as professional training. 
The additional educational requirement for lay persons in the 
1986 amendments does distinguish them from the jurors described by 
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the Select Committees who examined the workings of Singapore juries. 
However, additional education in general would not give lay persons 
legal knowledge, and their inclusion in the 1986 amendments may have 
also been prompted by other factors. In Fiat Justitia: A History of the 
Law Society of Singapore, Kevin Tan noted that in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew articulated his 
expectations for the legal profession and the Law Society in post-
independent Singapore: 
First, that lawyers show and carry themselves as upright, 
honourable members of a respected profession. Second, that 
lawyers understand the socio-economic milieu in which they 
operate and not blindly apply the foreign legal concepts they learnt 
at school. And third, that functional groups like the Law Society 
should not only lead by example in the way they conduct their 
affairs, but also assist the government in supporting its nation-
building agenda.299 
According to Tan, the first major confrontation between the Prime 
Minister and the Law Society of Singapore concerned disciplinary 
proceedings against two advocates and solicitors, T.T. Rajah and David 
Marshall.300 On August 16, 1972, the Council of the Law Society “was 
summoned to the Prime Minister’s Office in the Istana grounds to face 
a livid Lee Kuan Yew. Lee was furious about what he considered to be 
inordinate delays in the disciplinary proceeding.” 301  During the 
meeting, Lee scolded the Council, saying that “members of the Bar 
lacked discipline and that he was considering taking away the 
Council’s powers but had been advised against doing so by his Law 
Minister, [E.W.] Barker.”302 Lee advised the Council that “this would 
be his ‘final warning’ and that if the Law Society could not discipline 
its members, he would not hesitate to take away their powers and ‘make 
fools of the Council members in public.’”303 In a 1977 speech, the 
Prime Minister reiterated these concerns: 
There is with lawyers – as with jurors, which we have had to 
abolish – an unwillingness to do the unpleasant. If we are to 
maintain standards of integrity it means axing those who do 
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not measure up to these standards. You know as I do, Mr. 
Chairman, that when it came to several crunches in the past 
few years, what the Council did was to flinch from the 
unpleasant. Instead of seeking to strike a member off the 
rolls and pressing for it, it has allowed members to be 
suspended for 6 months, or for a year, or for two years. This 
is not the way to maintain standards of honourable 
conduct.304 
Another factor in the conflict between the Law Society and the 
Prime Minister was the Law Society leadership. Tan notes:  
By the mid 1980s, there was a sense of restlessness at the Bar, 
especially among the younger lawyers, most of whom had been 
called to the Bar in 1970s. Many young lawyers felt that the 
Council was too placid and that the Society was out of touch with 
the general public. They wanted a more vibrant and energetic Bar 
who did more to serve the public.305  
During the term of Harry Elias as President, this energy manifested in 
the creation of a volunteer lawyer organization to represent 
unrepresented criminal defendants, but “this activism within the Bar 
was beginning to worry the [People’s Action Party] government who 
viewed with grave suspicion any kind of political mobilisation.”306 
After Francis Seow was elected President of the Law Society, he 
asserted the equality of the bar with the judiciary in a fiery speech at 
the Opening of the Legal Year.307 He also attracted the attention of the 
Prime Minister, who wondered how someone like Seow, with two 
previous suspensions, could take on the role of President of the Law 
Society.308 
Tan notes that in the following months, “Lee Kuan Yew would 
make good his 1972 threat to take the Law Society to task and ‘make 
fools’ of its Council ‘in public.’”309 As the person essentially in charge 
of Select Committee hearings on the Legal Profession (Amendment) 
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Bill,310 Lee Kuan Yew put members of the Law Society Council on the 
stand, “treat[ed] them as hostile witnesses and corner[ed] them with 
leading questions and constant interruptions.” 311  Sessions were 
recorded and played on prime time television every evening.312 
One issue raised in the Legal Profession Amendment Act was the 
Law Society’s ability to comment on pending legislation. In 1986, the 
Law Society had issued a press statement questioning the terms of 
proposed legislation designed to give the state control over what the 
“foreign press” published on Singapore.313 Jothie Rajah has observed 
that the press statement distributed by the Law Society Council was in 
line with the Legal Profession Act, which at that time included in the 
Council’s functions examining and reporting upon current or proposed 
legislation should it think fit.314 However, the government insisted that 
the “Law Society had, by making a public statement, breached state- 
Law Society relations,”315 and had unacceptably entered the political 
sphere. Rajah characterizes the effect of this confrontation on the Law 
Society by noting that for “almost twenty years after the Hearings, the 
Law Society of Singapore stayed out of the public domain.”316 
The other issues in the 1986 amendments to the Legal Profession 
Act included the disciplinary process, discussed above, and bar 
leadership. In addition to introducing persons other than advocates and 
solicitors in the disciplinary process, the amendments provided that 
errant lawyers would be disqualified from standing for Council 
elections.317 Cumulatively, these changes indicated a shift away from 
self-regulation and toward regulation by a wider group of stakeholders, 
but they also had the effect of limiting lawyer participation in the 
greater legal system. 
After the amendment of the Legal Profession Act in 1986, lay 
participation in the Inquiry Committee 318  and the Disciplinary 
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Committee319 continued until 2008.320 Following the Legal Profession 
(Amendment) Act of 2008, the Disciplinary Committee was 
reconfigured into the Disciplinary Tribunal, and lay persons were 
removed from this stage.321 A main reason was to reduce delay, as 
expeditious resolution of complaints was a longstanding concern but it 
had proven difficult to get the requisite quorum of lay persons, legal 
service officers, and advocates and solicitors within a reasonable period 
of time. 322  Currently, lay persons have no representation on the 
Disciplinary Tribunal.323 
Lay participation continues to remain a part of the Inquiry 
Committee today, 324 as does the requirement that lay persons have 
education and professional training.325 A recent development in the 
composition of Inquiry Committees has been the recruitment of law 
professors as lay persons. 326  Appointment of law professors as lay 
persons reinforces the understanding that lay persons are not 
necessarily the average citizen, but rather an educated person with 
professional standing in society. 
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING SINGAPORE: THE EDUCATED 
PROFESSIONAL AS LAYPERSON 
The use of lay persons in the Singapore lawyer disciplinary 
process raises a perennial question: how can lay persons participate in 
the administration of justice when they do not understand the law? 
Singapore has taken two different approaches to this difficulty, at 
different times and in different contexts. Lay persons were banished 
from the jury in 1969, when their deliberations without legal guidance 
led to perceived errors and difficulties in carrying out their duties. Lay 
persons have not been returned to this forum, although the issue has 
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been discussed occasionally. 327  More recently, lay persons were 
allowed to bring their perspective to bear on allegations of lawyer 
misconduct, but participation has been prescribed in two ways. First, 
lay persons do not deliberate alone; they investigate complaints jointly 
with legal service officers and advocates and solicitors. Legal service 
officers were included in the disciplinary process because they do not 
have the financial pressure faced by practicing advocates and solicitors, 
although the dynamic among these actors is unclear. Operating outside 
of commercial law practice, legal service officers could provide ballast 
to lay person views, but like lawyers their legal knowledge gives them 
an advantage over lay persons.328 Second, lay persons are required to 
have higher levels of education and be members of a profession. These 
restrictions on who a “lay person” is suggest that the consumer interest 
represented is not necessarily the person on the street, but rather 
persons who work with lawyers or engage legal services. The latter 
point is supported by the 1986 parliamentary debates regarding 
amendments to the Legal Profession Act, when then Minister for Law 
S. Jayakumar characterized lay persons as “people who are regular 
users of the services of lawyers”. 329  These lay persons have more 
experience judging the quality of legal services, and their educational 
and professional status arguably better equips them to evaluate the 
propriety of lawyer behavior and perhaps assert their opinions in 
discussions with legally trained persons. 
IV. COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS: WHO IS A WORTHY NON-
LAWYER IN LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS? 
Both the Japanese and Singaporean lawyer disciplinary systems 
involve people who are not lawyers. Among the various goals of lawyer 
discipline, both systems share a similar aim, which is to ensure the 
public’s trust in the profession. In terms of regulation, unlike the term 
“lay persons” in the Singaporean system, the Japanese term “persons 
of learning and experience” is not narrowly defined to include specific 
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professions. Lay person participation can be said to be more restricted 
in Singapore than in Japan in other ways as well. Lay persons are absent 
in the first stage of the Review Committee, and there are no lay persons 
on the more serious level of the Disciplinary Tribunal, while in Japan 
persons of learning and experience are involved in all discipline-related 
committees, at both the investigative stage and the examination stage. 
However, in practice the use of non-lawyers in Japan appears to be 
more restricted than in Singapore. Persons of learning and experience 
seem to be mainly university academics, and particularly law 
professors, so their ability to contribute a “layperson” perspective may 
be limited. Additionally, although non-lawyers have voting power, 
there are structural weaknesses in the system. Two of these 
weaknesses, the composition of the various discipline-related 
committees and the lack of further recourse for complainants beyond 
the JFBA, were recognized at the time of the reform deliberation. They 
were not addressed because the JSRC adopted the traditional Japanese 
practice of decision-making through consensus, which is time-
consuming, and the JSRC did not reach a consensus in the time 
available. 
Both systems have incorporated non-lawyer participation in the 
lawyer disciplinary process, but they have also both restricted that 
participation considerably. Restricting participation by prescribing 
qualifications, formally or informally, identifies some non-lawyers as 
worthy participants in the lawyer disciplinary process and others as not. 
These limitations could address some of the drawbacks of non-lawyers, 
such as limited legal knowledge, but structural weaknesses in the 
system, like in Japan, may affect non-lawyers’ participation in the 
regulation of legal ethics. The question for both systems is whether 
their restricted form of non-lawyer participation has brought about the 
desired reform. Evidence of impact is primarily an empirical question 
that requires data not currently available, because both systems 
subscribe to confidentiality of proceedings at the level of non-lawyer 
participation.330 The desirability of confidentiality and the impact of 
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non-lawyer participation therefore remain active questions for both 
systems to consider. 
 
may determine which would adequately inform the public of the findings and determination.” 
In Japan, see Ishida, supra note 24 at 244, 247; as pointed out by Ishida, the proceedings in Japan 
are “not open to the public” and the committee members have “confidential duty.” 
